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Abstract
Parigot [Computational Logic and Proof Theory, vol. 713, 1993, p. 263] suggested symmetric structural
reduction rules to ensure unique representation of data types. We prove strong normalization of the second-
order -calculus with such rules.
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1. Introduction
Ever since its introduction by Parigot [11], the -calculus seems to have been quite successful
as an idealized programming language, especially for modeling of control operators. The -cal-
culus has continuation semantics (de Groote [5]) and an exact correspondence to the call-by-name
control-operator calculus (deGroote [6]). As shownby Streicher andReus [17], it is naturally derived
from the Krivine machine.
Parigot [11] was also motivated by the possibility of extracting witnesses from classical proofs
of 01 -formulae. Unfortunately, the reduction rules of the -calculus do not appear to be suf-
ﬁcient for this purpose. For example, let A(x) be an atomic formula of arithmetic. We represent
∃xA(x) as ∀X(∀x(A(x) → X) → X) in the second-order language, where the variable X ranges over
propositions. We expect a closed, normal deduction of ∃xA(x) to somehow contain the unique
ﬁrst-order term t such that A(t) holds. However, consider the following scenario: Suppose that
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A(t) holds but A(u) does not hold, and let M be a deduction of A(t) represented as a -term.
Then
X...[]u(.[]tM) (1)
is a closed, normal deduction of ∃xA(x), but it apparently contains two terms (t and u). More-
over, u is not the witness for ∃xA(x). This suggests that further reduction is needed to extract the
witness.
In order to solve a similar problem on normal forms of the natural-number type, Parigot [12]
proposed new reduction rules M(.N) ⇒ .N [M ∗/], where N [M ∗/] is deﬁned by inductive-
ly replacing all occurrences of []L in N with []M(L[M ∗/]). We refer collectively to these new
rules and the structural reduction rules of the -calculus as symmetric structural reduction rules,
and we call the -calculus with symmetric structural reduction the symmetric -calculus. Ong
and Stewart [10] subsequently deﬁned the call-by-value -calculus v, which uses symmetric
structural reduction, and showed that it can encode various control structures in computer pro-
grams.
In this paper, we prove strong normalization of the second-order predicate symmetric -cal-
culus and show that a closed, normal deduction of ∃xA(x) for an atomic formula A(x) contains the
unique ﬁrst-order term t which satisﬁesA(t). Ong and Stewart [10] mentioned that strong normaliza-
tion of the v-calculus can be proved by the method of reducibility candidates. Nakazawa [8] gave
a proof of strong normalization using CPS-translation. We improve on their result by removing
the call-by-value restriction on the reduction strategy and showing that witnesses can always be
extracted from deductions of 01 -formulae.
In the presence of symmetric structural reduction, the ﬁnal result of a computation may depend
on the reduction strategy employed. However, this non-determinism in our calculus is manageable
in the sense that if a program is of type ∃xA(x), then all values computed with that program are
guaranteed to satisfy the speciﬁcation given by A(x). Since symmetric structural reduction reﬂects
the symmetric nature of classical logic, the non-determinism in our -calculus may be an inherent
property of classical logic.
Strong normalization and extraction of witnesses for 01 -formulae are known to hold of the
symmetric -calculus for Peano arithmetic introduced by Barbanera and Berardi [3]. By use of an
extraction operator, witnesses for 01 -formulae can also be extracted in Parigot’s -calculus as
shown by Parigot [12] and the second-order sequent calculus as shown by Danos et al. [4]. Com-
pared to the symmetric -calculus for Peano arithmetic, however, our approach has the advantage
that the symmetric -calculus is an extension of the -calculus, which is in turn an extension
of the -calculus. Furthermore, unlike the case of the -calculus and the second-order sequent
calculus, our approach does not require use of an extraction operator.
The main technical result presented in this paper is strong normalization. Non-determinism
of our calculus precludes the possibility of CPS-translation. Further, the symmetric nature of
our structural reduction appears to preclude direct adaptation of Parigot’s proof [13] of strong
normalization for the original -calculus. Instead, we adapt Barbanera and Berardi’s method
[2,3] of using transﬁnite induction for deﬁning reducibility candidates. The requirements for
reducibility candidates are naturally obtained from the notion of validity introduced by
Prawitz [15].
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2. Symmetric λµ-calculus
The logic treated in this paper is second-order classical predicate logic. We formulate second-
order predicate logic as a many-sorted logic whose domains of quantiﬁcation are either ﬁrst-order
objects, or predicates over ﬁrst-order objects. To denote ﬁrst-order objects, we introduce ﬁrst-
order terms, which are constructed using constants c1, c2, . . ., function symbols f1, f2, . . ., and ﬁrst-
order variables x1, x2, . . . Formally, the syntax of a ﬁrst-order term t is speciﬁed by the BNF
notation
t ::= ci | xj | fkt1 · · · trk , (2)
where ci is a constant, xj is a ﬁrst-order variable, fk is a function symbol for a function with arity
rk , and t1, . . . , trk are ﬁrst-order terms. The symbols x, y , z are used to denote ﬁrst-order variables,
and t, u, v are used to denote ﬁrst-order terms.
In this paper, we refer to formulae as types. A type either consists of just ⊥ (the absurdity) or has
the form A or ¬A (the negation of A) for some A that contains neither ¬ nor ⊥. (For example, there
is no type such as A → ⊥.) We call such an A a proposition. To emphasize the restriction placed on
negation, we use the symbol • for ¬. For a proposition A, we deﬁne •A by the involution • • A = A.
The symbols A,B,A1, . . . are used to denote propositions, while the symbols C ,D,C1, . . . are used
for types.
Intuitively, propositions are the objects afﬁrmed or denied, and types are assertions, which af-
ﬁrm or deny propositions or show that a contradiction arises. This view is proposed by Stew-
art [16]. Formally, propositions are built up by using the following symbols and connectives: =,
to express equality between ﬁrst-order objects; n-ary predicate variables X ni , to form n-ary predi-
cates over ﬁrst-order objects; →, to express implication; and ∀, to indicate universal quantiﬁcation
over ﬁrst-order objects and predicates. The syntax of a proposition A is speciﬁed by the BNF
notation
A ::= t1 = t2 | X ni t1 · · · tn |A1 → A2 | ∀xA | ∀X ni A, (3)
where t1, . . . , tn are ﬁrst-order terms. We call a proposition of the form t1 = t2 an atomic prop-
osition. X , Y ,Z are used to denote predicate variables. Logical connectives and quantiﬁers other
than → and ∀ are deﬁned by using second-order constructs. For example, ∃xA(x) is deﬁned as
∀X(∀x(A(x) → X) → X), and A ∧ B as ∀X((A → B → X) → X).
Deﬁnition 1. An (n-ary) abstraction term is a term of the form x1 · · · xn.A for some proposition A.
The abstraction term x1 · · · xn.A denotes the n-ary predicate P deﬁned by Px1 · · · xn ↔ A(x1, . . . , xn).
If T is the abstraction term x1 · · · xn.A, then substitution of T for the n-ary predicate variable X in
B, which is denoted by B[T/X ], is deﬁned by replacing all occurrences of Xt1 · · · tn in which X is free
in B with A[t1, . . . , tn/x1, . . . , xn].
Deﬁnition 2. To denote deductions, we employ what we call -terms. If a -term M denotes a
deduction of some type C , we say that M is of type C . As shown in Table 1, we deﬁne the set of
-terms by relating them to various deductions, each of which is presented in the form of a tree.
Whenever an assumption of type C (where C is a type other than ⊥) appears in a -term, we call
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Table 1
-terms and their types
ai : Ai
[C ]
C : C
M : •A N : A
[M ]N : ⊥ [ ]
[A].... D1
M : ⊥
A.M : •A

[•A].... D2
M : ⊥
•A.M : A

M : A → B N : A
MN : B app.
[A].... D
M : B
A.M : A → B 
M : ∀xA
Mt : A[t/x] app.1
.... D3
M : A
x.M : ∀xA 1
M : ∀XA
MT : A[T/X ] app.2
.... D4
M : A
X.M : ∀XA 2
D3 has no open assumptions which have x as a free predicate variable. Similarly, D4 has no open assump-
tions which have X as a free ﬁrst-order variable.
that assumption a -variable of type C . We denote -variables of type C by Greek letters, with
C as a superscript: C ,C , . . .We choose the particular set Ax of propositions as axioms. For each
axiom Ai, there is a deduction of Ai without any premise and inference. We denote such a deduction
by -constant ai .
In Table 1, C stands for a type other than ⊥ (and M : C means that M is of type C); A and B
stand for propositions.When the inference discharges some assumption, the discharged assumption
is written to the right of the name of the inference in the diagrams above. (In the expression ,
for instance,  is the name of the inference and  is the discharged assumption.) Ai denotes the
ith axiom in Ax. The deduction of the axiom Ai is denoted by the constant ai .  and  bind the
-variable A in A and A, respectively, and similarly for the -variable •A. In addition, 
binds the ﬁrst-order variable x in x, and the predicate variable X in X . FV(M) denotes the set of all
free -variables in the -termM . IfM has no free -variables (but possibly has free ﬁrst-order
variables and/or free predicate variables), we say that M is closed. If a -term M is constructed
by rule app., app.1, or app.2, we say that M is constructed by application, or that M has a form of
application, or simply that M is application.
If we translate denial (•) as negation (¬), all the above rules are valid in classical logic. Conversely,
well-typed terms of Parigot’s -calculus can be translated into -terms of the sort given above, by
replacing -variables of type A (where A is what we are calling a proposition) with -variables of
type •A. Hence, the set of classically valid propositions is exactly the same as the set of propositions
which are inhabited by closed -terms.
The reason for use of the “Church-style formulation”, that is, incorporation of typing informa-
tion into the -terms, is that in the proof of strong normalization, we seem to need the fact that
every -term deﬁned in this way denotes a unique deduction.
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Parigot [14] proposed a single-conclusion system for the -calculus which is similar to our sys-
tem but allows for negation (¬) – which is exactly the same as denial (•) for us – to be applied to
subformulae as well.
For a type C other than ⊥, and a -term N of type C , substitution of N for the -variable
C in a -term M is deﬁned by replacing each free occurrence of C in M with N ; the resulting
-term is denoted byM [N/C]. To substitute a ﬁrst-order term t for the ﬁrst-order variable x in a
-term M , ﬁrst do the following: for every type C , and every -variable C in M that is outside
the binding constructs of x, replace C in M with C[t/x]; and then replace all free occurrences of
x in ﬁrst-order terms in M with t. The -term obtained by this procedure is denoted by M [t/x].
Substitution of an abstraction term T for the predicate variable X inM is deﬁned similarly, and the
resulting -term is denoted by M [T/X ].
Deﬁnition 3. We deﬁne transformations of -terms by the rules given below. To show that each of
these transformations preserves the type of a -term, we give a part of a corresponding deduction
for each -term that appears in the rules. The symbol D is used to denote the common part of
deductions before and after a transformation. Note that substitution of the -term N for the -
variable  in the -term M corresponds concatenation of two deduction D1 and D2 in the place
of the assumption , if N corresponds D1 and M corresponds D2.
For rule R (where R denotes any of the rules given below), the compatible closure of the bina-
ry relation deﬁned by R is called the one-step reduction relation by R or one-step reduction by R
(and is denoted by ⇒1R). The union, over all rules R, of such one-step reduction relations is called
the one-step reduction relation or one-step reduction (and is denoted by ⇒1). The reﬂexive and
transitive closure of the one-step reduction relation is called the reduction relation, or simply re-
duction (and is denoted by ⇒). Similarly, the reﬂexive and transitive closure of ⇒1R is denoted
by ⇒R.
If there is no rule that could be applied to a -termM , we say thatM is normal. IfM ⇒ N andN
is normal, we say that N is a normal form ofM . The length of the sequenceM ⇒1 M1 ⇒1 · · · ⇒1 Mn
of one-step reductions is deﬁned to be n. Let w(M) be the length of the longest sequence of one-step
reductions, if such exists; otherwise, w(M) is undeﬁned. M is strongly normalizable if and only if
w(M) is deﬁned.
-reduction rule:
[A].... D
M : B
.M : A → B  N : A
(.M)N : B
⇒1
N : A.... D
M [N/] : B
(4)
1-reduction rule:
.... D
M : A
x.M : ∀xA
(x.M)t : A[t/x]
⇒11
.... D[t/x]
M [t/x] : A[t/x] (5)
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D[t/x] is the deduction obtained from D by substitution of t for x in types and -terms in D.
2-reduction rule:.... D
M : A
X.M : ∀XA
(X.M)T : A[T/X ]
⇒12
.... D[T/X]
M [T/X ] : A[T/X ] (6)
The definition ofD[T/X ] is analogous to that ofD[t/x]. The -, 1-, and 2-rules are just the →- and
∀-contraction rules of natural deduction. Also, they are extensions of -reduction in the -calculus
for predicate logic.
-reduction rule: This rule appeared in Parigot [14] and Stewart [16]. There are two cases, L and
R. The L-rule is similar to the ¬-contraction rule of natural deduction.
[A].... D
M : ⊥
.M : •A  N : A
[.M ]N : ⊥
⇒1L
N : A.... D
M [N/] : ⊥
(7)
M : •A
[•A].... D
N : ⊥
.N : A 
[M ].N : ⊥
⇒1R
M : •A.... D
N [M/] : ⊥
(8)
-reduction rule: Again, there are two cases, L and R. The former appeared in Parigot [14]. If we
think of • as negation, then Andou’s reduction for ⊥c [1] also resembles the L-rule. The -rules are
needed for the encoding of symmetric structural reduction, as shown later. The 1- and 2-rules are
analogous to the L-rules.
[•(A→B)].... D
M : ⊥
.M : A → B  N : A
(.M)N : B
⇒1L
[•B]
[A→B] N : A
N : B
[](N) : ⊥
.[](N) : •(A → B) .... D
M [.[](N)/] : ⊥
.M [.[](N)/] : B 
(9)
M : A → B
[•A].... D
N : ⊥
.N : A 
M(.N) : B
⇒1R
[•B]
M : A → B [A]
M : B
[](M) : ⊥
.[](M) : •A .... D
N [.[](M)/] : ⊥
.N [.[](M)/] : B 
(10)
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1-reduction rule:
[•∀xA].... D
M : ⊥
.M : ∀xA
(.M)t : A[t/x]
⇒11
[•A[t/x]]
[∀xA]
t : A[t/x]
[](t) : ⊥
.[](t) : •∀xA .... D
M [.[](t)/] : ⊥
.M [.[](t)/] : A[t/x] 
(11)
2-reduction rule:
[•∀XA].... D
M : ⊥
.M : ∀XA
(.M)T : A[T/X ]
⇒12
[•A[T/X ]]
[∀XA]
T : A[T/X ]
[](T) : ⊥
.[](T) : •∀XA .... D
M [.[](T)/] : ⊥
.M [.[](T)/] : A[T/X ] 
(12)
•-reduction rule: The •-, •1-, and •2-rules are similar to Prawitz’s reduction for ⊥c. The idea is to
reduce the complexity of the type of the assumption discharged by the -inference if the type is a
denial.
[•(A→B)].... D
M : ⊥
.M : A → B 
⇒1•
[•B]
[A→B] [	A]
	 : B
[](	) : ⊥
.[](	) : •(A → B) .... D
M [.[](	)/] : ⊥
.M [.[](	)/] : B 
	..M [.[](	)/] : A → B 	
(13)
•1-reduction rule:
[•∀xA].... D
M : ⊥
.M : ∀xA
⇒1•1
[•A]
[∀xA]
x : A
[](x) : ⊥
.[](x) : •∀xA .... D
M [.[](x)/] : ⊥
.M [.[](x)/] : A 
x..M [.[](x)/] : ∀xA
(14)
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•2-reduction rule: Let T0 be the abstraction term x1 · · · xn.Xx1 · · · xn, where n is the arity of X .
[•∀XA].... D
M : ⊥
.M : ∀XA
⇒1•2
[•A]
[∀XA]
T0 : A
[](T0) : ⊥
.[](T0) : •∀XA .... D
M [.[](T0)/] : ⊥
.M [.[](T0)/] : A 
X..M [.[](T0)/] : ∀XA
(15)
S-reduction rule: This rule is analogous to 
-reduction in the -calculus. If the -variable •A is
not free in M , the following reduction is possible.
[•A]
.... D
M : A
[]M : ⊥
.[]M : A 
⇒1S
.... D
M : A (16)
There is a certain amount of redundancy in these reduction rules. L-reduction is derivable from
•- and -reduction. 1- and 2-reduction are derivable from •1-, •2-, and -reduction. Despite this
redundancy, we choose to exhibit all the rules here in order to make clear the symmetric nature of
the -rule.
We can easily see that our calculus is an extension of Parigot’s -calculus. The -rule is the same
as -reduction in the -calculus. The -rule is an extension of Parigot’s renaming rule [].M ⇒
M [/]. Using  and our -rules, we can derive the symmetric structural reduction rules from
Parigot [12] that we referred to in Section 1:
(. · · · []N · · ·)L ⇒ . · · · [.[](L)]N · · ·
⇒ . · · · [](NL) · · ·N(. · · · []L · · ·)
⇒ . · · · [.[](N)]L · · ·
⇒ . · · · [](NL) · · ·
(17)
In this way, we can formalize structural reduction by usual substitution.
Our S-reduction rule is equivalent to the (S2)-rule in Parigot [12]. S-reduction and •-, •1-, and
•2-reduction are needed for the extraction of witnesses.
3. Extraction of witnesses from 0
1
-formulae
Since our calculus can simulate Parigot’s symmetric structural reduction, -terms of the nat-
ural-number type are reduced to Church numerals as mentioned by Parigot [12]. See Nour [9] for
a complete proof. However, this does not necessarily mean that witnesses can be extracted from
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proofs of 01 -formulae. It is instructive to see how the standard method used in intuitionistic logic
fails, even for 01 -formulae. For more about witness extraction of intuitionistic logic, for example,
see Girard et al. [7].
In the following discussion, we assume that 0 is included in the constants, and S is included in
the unary function symbols. 0 stands for zero in the natural numbers and S stands for the successor
function. The formula N(x) is deﬁned as ∀X(X 0 → (∀y(Xy → XSy) → Xx)).
Consider the deductionD of ∃x(N(x) ∧ A(x)), whereA(x) is an atomic proposition, shown inFig. 1.
D is not normal, but further reduction would involve only  and the ∃ quantiﬁer. In particular,
there is no way to eliminate D0.
Dropping the predicative part and supplying ∧-elimination yields the left-hand diagram in Fig.
2, which reduces to the right-hand diagram in the ﬁgure by reduction of redex (1). (N is the natu-
ral-number type, and 0 and n are the Church numerals for 0 and n, respectively.)
If we reduce redex (2), the right-hand diagram becomes .[]0, which reduces to 0. However,
there is no guarantee that A(0) holds.
The cause of the problem appears to stem from the presence of conjunction. Hence, we con-
sider only -terms of type ∃xA(x) for some atomic proposition A(x) and show that their normal
forms end with introduction of the ∃ quantiﬁer. Since ∃xA(x) is derivable from ∃x(N(x) ∧ A(x)), this
approach is sufﬁcient for extraction of witnesses for 01 -formulae.
Deﬁnition 4. If the set Ax of axioms satisﬁes the following conditions, we say that Ax is a Post
system.
(1) Each A ∈ Ax is of the form p1 → (p2 → (· · · → (pn−1 → pn)· · ·)), where p1, . . . , pn are atomic
propositions. For n = 2, 3, and 4, what this means is that these propositions are of the form
p1 → p2, p1 → (p2 → p3), and p1 → (p2 → (p3 → p4)), respectively.
(2) If A ∈ Ax , then for each ﬁrst-order variable x and ﬁrst-order term t, the proposition A[t/x]
obtained by substituting t for x is also an element of Ax.
Note that in intuitionistic logic, if all non-logical axiomsconstitute aPost system, all the rulesof in-
ference in a closed, normal deduction of an atomic proposition are elimination rules.
We will see later that a similar property holds of classical logic in the presence of symmetric
structural reduction rules. By restricting quantiﬁers over the natural numbers to the predicate
N(x) ≡ ∀X(X 0 → (∀y(Xy → XSy) → Xx)) and replacing ⊥ (the symbol for absurdity) in the lan-
guage of arithmetic with 0 = S0, second-order Peano Arithmetic can be formalized by a Post
system.
Fig. 1. Deduction of ∃x(N(x) ∧ A(x)).
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Fig. 2. Propositional part and its reduction.
Theorem 5. Assume that Ax is a Post system. Let A(x) be an atomic proposition, and letM be a closed,
normal -term of type ∃xA(x). Then M has the form X..tN , where t is a ﬁrst-order term and N
is a closed, normal -term of type A(t).
To prove the theorem, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Assume that Ax is a Post system. Let M be a normal -term whose type is an
atomic proposition. Assume that every -variable of M either is of type ∀x(A(x) → X) for some
proposition A or is a denial •B. Assume, furthermore, that M does not begin with . Then M is
closed.
Proof. By induction on the construction ofM .
Case I. M is a -variable. This case cannot occur, since ∀x(A(x) → X) and •B are not atomic
propositions.
Case II. M is an axiom. Then M is closed.
Case III. M is constructed by application. Then M has the form M012 · · ·n, where M0 is
an axiom or a -variable and i is either a -term, a ﬁrst-order term, or an abstraction term.
Suppose that M0 is a -variable. For application to be possible, and since the type of M0 is either
∀x(A(x) → X) or a denial,M0 must be of type ∀x(A(x) → X). Therefore, the type ofM contains the
predicate variable X , which contradicts the assumption thatM is of an atomic proposition. Hence,
M0 is an axiom. By the constraints given in Definition 4, i is a -term whose type is an atomic
proposition. Since M is normal, i cannot begin with  (otherwise, -reduction could be applied).
By the induction hypothesis, i has no free -variables. Hence, M is closed.
Case IV. M begins with . This case cannot occur, since M is of an atomic proposition.
Case V. M is of the form []M0. Then M is of type ⊥. This contradicts the assumption that M is
of an atomic proposition. 
Remark 7.Using this lemma, we can show that a closed, normal -term L of an atomic proposition
is constructed by axioms and application. The only way in which the proof differs from the proof in
intuitionistic logic is in the case where L contains the symbols  and [ ]. Because of the -reduction
rules, these symbols can appear only at the beginning of a -term. So suppose that L ≡ .[]M
and that L is a closed, normal -term of an atomic proposition.M cannot begin with , otherwise
we could apply -reduction to .[]M . Hence we can apply the above lemma to M . Since M has
no free -variables, S-reduction can be applied to L, in contradiction to our assumption about L.
Hence, neither nor [ ] appears in L. The rest of the proof is similar to the case of intuitionistic logic.
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Proof of the Theorem. By the type of M , M could begin with either  or . However, if M
began with , a •2-reduction rule could be applied to M . Hence M is of the form X.M1. By
similar reasoning, M1 begins with . Hence, M is of the form X.∀y(A(y)→X).M2. By the type of
M2, M2 either begins with  or can be constructed by application. We consider these two
possibilities.
Case I. M2 is constructed by application. Let M2 ≡ M312 · · ·n, where M3 is not constructed
by application.M3 is either an axiom ai for some integer i or a -variable, otherwise we could apply
one of , 1, 2, , 1, 2-reduction rules to M2. On the other hand, M3 cannot be an axiom since the
type of M3 contains a predicate variable X but this is impossible. Since the only open -variable
of M2 has type ∀y(A(y) → X), M2 has a form tN where t is a ﬁrst-order term and N is a -term
with type A(t).
N cannot begin with , otherwise we could apply -reduction to the redex (t)N . Hence, we
can apply the previous lemma to N and infer that N is closed. So the conclusion of the theorem is
satisﬁed.
Case II. M2 begins with . Then M2 is of the form .[]M3. M3 cannot begin with , otherwise
-reduction could be applied toM2. Since the type ofM3 is atomic,M3 is constructed by application.
By reasoning similar to that used above,M3 is of the form tN . By the previous lemma, N is closed.
Hence, S-reduction can be applied to .[]tN . This contradicts the normality of M . Therefore,
this case cannot occur. 
4. Strong normalization
This section is devoted to the proof of strong normalization. We ﬁrst show that strong nor-
malization for the full calculus can be reduced to strong normalization of reductions that do not
involve use of the L-, 1-, 2-, and S-rules. As noted before, the L-, 1-, and 2-rules can be derived
from the •-, •1-, and •2-rules and the -, 1-, and 2-rules. In the case of the S-rules, we exploit
the fact that S-reduction can be postponed until after other kinds of reduction have been carried
out.
Let ⇒∗ and ⇒1∗ denote reduction and one-step reduction without use of the S-, L-, 1-, and
2-rules.
Proposition 8. LetM ,N ,K be -terms, and assume thatM ⇒1S N ⇒1∗ K. Then there is a -term L
such that M = L, M ⇒∗ L, and L ⇒S K. (Note that L could be identical to K.)
Proof.M can be written as E[.[]M1], with  not free inM1. We will check all possible reduction
rules R other than S , L, 1, and 2 (that is, we will set R to each such rule in turn, substituting its
name for ∗ in N ⇒1∗ K , and then show that there exists L /= M such thatM ⇒∗ L ⇒S K , where the∗ in M ⇒∗ K stands for any rule other than S , L, 1, and 2).
Case I. R = . In this case, N and K can be written as E[M1] = E′[(.N1)N2] and E′[N1[N2/]],
respectively. There are several possibilities for the relationship ofM1 toN1 andN2. First, we consider
the case where M1 contains the -term (.N1)N2. Let M1 be E′′[(.N1)N2]. Then we can take L
to be E[.[]E′′[N1[N2/]]]. Next, we consider the case where N1 or N2 containsM1. If N1 contains
M1, let N1 be E′′[M1], in which case we can take L to be E′[(E′′[.[]M1])[N2/]]. If N2 containsM1,
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let N2 be E′′[M1], in which case we can take L to be E[N1[E′′[.[]M1]/]]. Finally, we consider the
case where M1 = .N1. The following reduction is possible.
(.[].N1)N2 ⇒• (	..[.[](	)].N1)N2
⇒ .[.[](N2)].N1
⇒ .[](.N1)N2
⇒ .[]N1[N2/]
⇒S N1[N2/].
(18)
Here, we can take L to be E′[.[]N1[N2/]]. These three cases cover all the possibilities in which
M1 and (.N1)N2 have an overlap. If there is no overlap betweenM1 and (.N1)N2, the conclusion
of the proposition is obvious.
Case II. R = 1 or 2. The proof of this case is similar to the case R = .
Case III. R = . Assume that N = E[M1] = E′[[N1].N2] and K = E′[N2[N1/]]. (The proof for
the case, where N is of the form E′[[.N1]N2] and K is of the form E′[N1[N2/]] is similar.) Just
as in case I, there are four possibilities, corresponding to the relative positions of M , N1, and N2.
Only for the caseM1 = .N2 is the proof non-trivial. In this case, we can use K itself as L, since the
following reduction is possible.
[N1](.[](.N2)) ⇒ [N1](.N2)
⇒ N2[N1/]. (19)
Case IV. R = R. Assume that N is of the form E′[N1(.N2)], and that K is of the form E′[.N2
[.[]N1/]]. As before, the only non-trivial case is that of M1 = .N2. Since the following re-
duction is possible, we can choose L to be E′[.[](.N2[.[]N1/])].
N1(.[](.N2)) ⇒R .[.[](N1)](.N2)⇒ .[](N1(.N2))
⇒R .[](.N2[.[]N1/])⇒S .N2[.[]N1/].
(20)
Case V.R = •. Assume thatN = E′[.N1] and that.N1 has been reduced by application of the
•-rule to the outermost -symbol. Since either N1 containsM1 orM1 contains .N1, the conclusion
of the proposition is obvious. The cases R = •1 and R = •2 are treated similarly. 
Proposition 9. If a -term M is strongly normalizable via ⇒∗, then M is strongly normalizable
via ⇒.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive, so assume that M is not strongly normalizable via ⇒. By
König’s lemma, there is an inﬁnite sequenceM ⇒1 M1 ⇒1 M2 ⇒1 · · · For reasons stated earlier, we
can assume that this sequence does not use the L-, 1-, and 2-rules. Since it is impossible that, from
some point on, all these reductions are S-reductions (i.e., we cannot have Mk ⇒1S Mk+1 ⇒1S · · · for
some k  1), there are inﬁnitely many ⇒1∗ in the sequence. Using the proposition above, we can
construct an arbitrarily long ﬁnite sequence of ⇒1∗ fromM . Hence,M is not strongly normalizable
via ⇒∗. 
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Next, we use the method of reducibility candidates to prove strong normalization via ⇒∗. From
this point on, ⇒1∗ and ⇒∗ are written as ⇒1 and ⇒ for simplicity. Our construction of reducibility
follows the notion of strong validity introduced by Prawitz [15]. Strongly valid -terms are either (1)
-terms that are constructed from strongly valid -terms by introduction rules or (2) -terms
all of whose reduction sequences lead to -terms that can be obtained as in (1). Strong validity
of a -term M with a free -variable  of type C is deﬁned by strong validity of M [N/] for
all strongly valid terms N of type C . For intuitionistic logic, this gives an inductive definition over
construction of formulae. To adapt this idea, we had to specify what the introduction rules are.
We decided that the -rule, as well as the -, 1-, and 2-rules, are the introduction rules for this
purpose. For example, the -term
[ : •A]....
M : ⊥
.M : A
(21)
is strongly valid if and only if M is strongly valid. M is strongly valid if and only if for all strongly
valid terms N of type •A, M [N/] is strongly valid. There is circularity in our definition, since the
notion of strongly validity over -terms of type •A depends on the notion of strong validity over
-terms of type A. We resolve this circularity by transﬁnite induction up to the ﬁrst uncountable
ordinal, ω1. We denote the set of -variables and -constants of type C as VC .
Deﬁnition 10.
(1) For a set S of -terms of type C , Cl(S) is deﬁned as the smallest set of -terms of type C ,
which satisﬁes the following conditions. (Cl is a closure operator.)
(a) S ,VC ⊆ Cl(S).
(b) Let  be either a -term, a ﬁrst-order term, or an abstraction term. IfM is a -term of
type C and N ∈ Cl(S) for all N such that M ⇒1 N , then M ∈ Cl(S).
Note that if all the -terms in S are strongly normalizable, then all the -terms in Cl(S)
are strongly normalizable.
(2) The set of strongly normalizable -terms of type ⊥ is also denoted by ⊥.
(3) Let S be a set of -terms of type A (resp. •A). Then the set •S of -terms of type •A (resp. A)
is deﬁned as
•S := {.M |∀N ∈ S ,M [N/] ∈ ⊥}. (22)
Note that if S is not empty and the type of -terms of S is a proposition, then •S consists
of strongly normalizable terms. This is because •, •1, •2-reductions cannot be applied to the
outermost  of .M ∈ •S and M is strongly normalizable by the definition of •.
(4) The operator D(S) is deﬁned as Cl(S ∪ • • S). Note that •• is a monotone operator, as is D. For
ordinals , we deﬁne D as
D0(S) := S , (23)
D(S) := D
(⋃
<
D(S)
)
. (24)
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Dω1(S) is a ﬁxed point ofD, where ω1 is the ﬁrst uncountable ordinal. In particular, • • Dω1(S) ⊆
Dω1(S).
Deﬁnition 11. Let SA and SB be sets of -terms of type A and B, respectively. Then the set SA → SB
of -terms of type A → B is deﬁned by the following two-step process:
L(SA, SB) := {A.M |∀N ∈ SA,M [N/A] ∈ SB}, (25)
SA → SB := Dω1(L(SA, SB)). (26)
Deﬁnition 12. Let (ti)i∈I be a non-empty family of ﬁrst-order terms, and for each i ∈ I let Si be
a set of -terms of type A[ti/x]. We deﬁne the set ∧ i∈I
1st-ord.
Si of -terms of type ∀xA as fol-
lows. ∏
i∈I
1st-ord.
Si := {x.M |∀i ∈ I ,M [ti/x] ∈ Si}, (27)
∧
i∈I
1st-ord.
Si := Dω1
( ∏
i∈I
1st-ord.
Si
)
. (28)
Though A does not appear in the notation, the definition of
∧
i∈I
1st-ord.
Si may depend on the choice of
A and x.
Deﬁnition 13. Let (Ti)i∈I be a non-empty family of abstraction terms, and for each i ∈ I let Si
be a set of -terms of type A[Ti/X ]. We deﬁne the set ∧ i∈I
abstr.
Si of -terms of type ∀XA as
follows.∏
i∈I
abstr.
Si := {X.M |∀i ∈ I ,M [Ti/X ] ∈ Si}, (29)
∧
i∈I
abstr.
Si := Dω1
( ∏
i∈I
abstr.
Si
)
. (30)
As in the previous definition, the definition of
∧
i∈I
abstr.
Si may depend on the choice of A and X .
Deﬁnition 14. For a proposition A, RA is the smallest set which satisﬁes the conditions stated be-
low. If R ∈ RA, we say that R is a reducibility candidate of proposition A. In keeping with our
distinction between types and propositions, reducibility candidates are deﬁned only for proposi-
tions.
(1) If A is atomic or of the form Xt1 · · · tn, then Dω1(VA) ∈ RA.
(2) If A ∈ RA and B ∈ RB, then A → B ∈ RA→B.
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(3) Let (ti)i∈I be a non-empty family of ﬁrst-order terms, and for each i ∈ I let Ri be a reducibility
candidate of type A[ti/x]. Then∧ i∈I
1st-ord.
Ri ∈ R∀xA.
(4) Let (Ti)i∈I be a non-empty family of abstraction terms, and for each i ∈ I letRi be a reducibility
candidate of proposition A[Ti/X ]. Then∧ i∈I
abstr.
Ri ∈ R∀XA.
Note that a reducibility candidate R can be written as Dω1(S) for a set S of -terms such that no
element of S begins with .
Proposition 15. Let R be a reducibility candidate.
(1) R is non-empty, and all -terms in R are strongly normalizable.
(2) If M ∈ R and M ⇒1 N , then N ∈ R.
(3) For M ∈ •R and N ∈ R, [M ]N ∈ ⊥.
The proof of the proposition uses induction on the construction of the candidate R. Each step of
the induction is broken up into Lemmata 18–21. Before proceeding with the proof of clauses 1 and
2 of the proposition, we show that clause 3 can be derived from clauses 1 and 2.
Lemma 16.Let S be a set of -terms which does not begin with.We assume that all terms contained
in S has a same type. Let P = Dω1(S). Then we have P = Cl(S ∪ • • P).
Proof. The inclusion from right to left is immediate, by the closure property of Cl and the fact that
• • P ⊆ P and S = D0(S) ⊆ Dω1(S) = P . To see the inclusion from left to right, we let R = Cl(S ∪
• • P) and prove that D(S) ⊆ R for all ordinals   ω1. The proof is by induction on . Clearly,
D0(S) (=S) ⊆ R, so the base case holds. Let  be an ordinal such that 0 <   ω1. By the induction
hypothesis,D(S) ⊆ R for all  < . LetQ be⋃< D(S). Thenwe haveQ ⊆ P . By themonotonicity
of the •• operator, • • Q ⊆ • • P . Since • • P ⊆ R, we have • • Q ⊆ R. Hence Q ∪ • • Q ⊆ R. By the
closure property of Cl, Cl(Q ∪ • • Q) ⊆ R, so D(S) = D(Q) = Cl(Q ∪ • • Q) ⊆ R. 
In the remainder of the paper, we sometimes use Lemma 16 without mention.
Lemma 17. If a reducibility candidateR satisﬁes clauses 1 and 2 of Proposition 15, then for allM ∈ •R
and N ∈ R, [M ]N ∈ ⊥.
Proof. As noted in Definition 14, R can be written as Dω1(S) for a set S of -terms such that no
element of S begins with .
AssumeM ∈ •R and N ∈ R. To complete the proof of the lemma, it sufﬁces to show that every
K such that [M ]N ⇒1 K is strongly normalizable. We consider all possibilities for the reduction of
[M ]N . We use induction on w(M)+ w(N). N is strongly normalizable by the clause 1 of Proposition
15. M is strongly normalizable since R is not empty. (See the clause 3 of Definition 10.)
Case I. K is of the form [M ′]N ′, where M ⇒ M ′ and N ⇒ N ′. In this case, M ′ ∈ •R by the def-
inition of •, and N ′ ∈ R by clause 2 of Proposition 15. By the induction hypothesis, K ∈ ⊥, since
w(M ′)+ w(N ′)< w(M)+ w(N).
Case II.M ≡ .M1 and K ≡ M1[N/x]. SinceM ∈ •R and N ∈ R,M1[N/x] ∈ ⊥ by the definition
of •.
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Case III. N ≡ .N1 and K ≡ N1[M/]. Since R = Cl(S ∪ • • R) and S does not contain a -
term beginning with , N must be an element of • • R. Hence N1[M/] ∈ ⊥. 
Lemma 18. If R = Dω1(VA) for an atomic proposition A, then Proposition 15 holds.
Proof. Non-emptiness and strong normalizability are easy. To prove the second clause, let  be the
least ordinal such that M ∈ D(VA). The proof is by induction on .
If  = 0, thenM is a -variable and the conclusion of the lemma follows. If  > 0, then eitherM
has a form of application orM ∈ • •⋃1< D1(VA). By the definitions of Cl and •, the conclusion
of the lemma holds in either case. (Note that •-, •1-, and •2-reduction cannot be applied to the
outermost .) 
Lemma 19. Let A,B be reducibility candidates that satisfy all three clauses of Proposition 15. Then
R = A → B is non-empty and the following hold of all M ∈ R.
(1) M is strongly normalizable.
(2) If M ⇒1 N , then N ∈ R.
(3) If N ∈ A, then MN ∈ B.
Proof. Again, non-emptiness is easy. Let D() be D(L(A,B)). We prove, by induction on ordinals
  ω1, that for allM ∈ D(),M is strongly normalizable and ifM ⇒1 N , then N ∈ D(). We show
further that MN ∈ B for every N ∈ A.
If  = 0, then the conclusion follows from the definition of L(A,B) and the facts that A is
not empty and B satisﬁes clauses 1 and 2 of Proposition 15. Assume  > 0. First we prove that
M is strongly normalizable and if M ⇒1 N , then N ∈ D(). If we prove this for the case where
M ∈ • •⋃1< D(1), the conclusion for the general case follows from the definition of Cl. Hence
assume that M is of the form .M1. We denote
⋃
1<
D(1) by S .
M1 is strongly normalizable since •S is not empty. We further use induction on w(M1) and show
that each -term M ′ such that M ⇒1 M ′ is strongly normalizable and that M ′ ∈ D(). If the re-
duction does not consist of a •-rule applied to the outermost , then M ′ ≡ .M ′1 ∈ • • S ⊆ D().
By the induction hypothesis (for the induction on w(M1)) and the fact that w(M ′1) < w(M1), M ′
is strongly normalizable. Hence assume that M is reduced by the •-rule applied to the outermost
. Then M ′ = ..M1[	.[]	/]. To prove that M ′ ∈ D() and M ′ is strongly normalizable,
choose some 1 <  and let N ∈ D(1). In addition, let L ∈ A and K ∈ •B. Note that NL ∈ B, by
the induction hypothesis (for the induction on ). Hence [K]NL ∈ ⊥. Since 1 <  and N was an
arbitrary element ofD(1), we have 	.[K]	L ∈ •S . Using the hypothesis that .M1 ∈ • • S , we see
that M1[	.[K]	L/] ∈ ⊥. Since K ∈ •B, we get .M1[	.[]	L/] ∈ • • B ⊆ B. This means that
M ′ ∈ L(A,B), hence that M ′ is strongly normalizable and M ′ ∈ D().
Next, we prove that MN ∈ B for each N ∈ A. As noted in Definition 14, A = Dω1(X) for some
set X of -terms. We can assume that X does not contain a -term beginning with . Let  be
the least ordinal such that N ∈ D(X). By induction on  and w(M)+ w(N), we will prove that if
MN ⇒1 L, then L ∈ B. This is precisely the condition that MN ∈ B.
Case I. L ≡ M ′N ′, and either (M ⇒1 M ′ and N ≡ N ′) or (M ≡ M ′ and N ⇒1 N ′). The conclusion
follows from the induction hypothesis (for the induction on w(M)+ w(N)).
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Case II. M ≡ .M1 and L ≡ M1[N/]. Since M ∈ L(A,B), the conclusion follows.
Case III. N is of the form .N1 and L is obtained from reduction of the outermost redex.
Then L is of the form .N1[.[](M)/]. Choose some 1 < , and let Q ∈ D1(X). Further-
more, let P ∈ •B. By the induction hypothesis (for the induction on ), we have MQ ∈ B. By
reasoning similar to that used above, it follows that .[P ](M) ∈ •⋃1< D1(X). Since N be-
gins with , N ∈ • •⋃1< D1(X). We thus have N1[.[P ](M)/] ∈ ⊥, hence that L ∈• • B ⊆ B. 
Lemma 20. Let I be a non-empty index set such that for each i ∈ I , Ri is a reducibility candidate of
proposition A[ti/x], and let R =∧ i∈I
1st-ord.
Ri. Assume that for each i ∈ I , Ri satisﬁes all the clauses of
Proposition 15. Then R is non-empty, and the following hold of all M ∈ R.
(1) M is strongly normalizable.
(2) If M ⇒1 N , then N ∈ R.
(3) Mti ∈ Ri.
Proof.Again, non-emptiness is easy. LetD() beD(
∏
i∈I
1st-ord.
Ri).We prove, by induction on   ω1,
that for allM ∈ D(),M is strongly normalizable and ifM ⇒1 N , then N ∈ D(). We show further
that Mti ∈ Ri for each i ∈ I .
If  = 0, then the conclusion follows from the facts that I is not empty and for each i ∈ I , Ri
satisﬁes all the clauses of Proposition 15. The fact that Mti ∈ Ri for each i ∈ I is obtained from
the definition of
∏
i∈I
1st-ord.
Ri . Assume  > 0. First we prove that M is strongly normalizable and if
M ⇒1 N , then N ∈ D(). If we prove this for the case whereM ∈ • •⋃1< D(), the conclusion for
the general case follows from the definition of Cl. Hence assume that M is of the form .M1. We
denote
⋃
1<
D(1) by S .
Since all -terms in S are strongly normalizable by the induction hypothesis, M1 is strong-
ly normalizable. We further use induction on w(M1) and show that every M ′ such that M ⇒1
M ′ is strongly normalizable and that M ′ ∈ D(). If the reduction rule is not the •1-rule for the
outermost , then M ′ ≡ .M ′1 ∈ • • S ⊆ D(). By the induction hypothesis (for the induction
on w(M1)) and the fact that w(M ′1) < w(M1), M ′ is strongly normalizable. Hence assume that M
is reduced by the •1-rule for the outermost . Then M ′ = x..M1[	.[]	x/]. Choose some
1 < , and let N ∈ D(1). Also, let K ∈ •Ri . By the induction hypothesis (for the induction on
), Nti ∈ Ri; hence, [K]Nti ∈ ⊥. Since 1 <  and N ∈ D(1) ⊆ S , we have 	.[K]	ti ∈ •S . Further-
more,M1[	.[K]	ti/] ∈ ⊥, because.M1 ∈ • • S . SinceK ∈ •Ri, we see that.M1[	.[]	ti/] ∈
• • Ri ⊆ Ri . This means that M ′ ∈∏ i∈I
1st-ord.
Ri, hence that M ′ is strongly normalizable and
M ′ ∈ D().
Next, we prove thatMti ∈ Ri . We will show that N ∈ Ri for all N such thatMti ⇒1 N . The proof
is by induction on w(M).
Case I. N ≡ M ′ti and M ⇒1 M ′. By the induction hypothesis and the fact that w(M ′) < w(M),
the conclusion follows.
Case II. M ≡ x.M1 and N ≡ M1[ti/x]. Since M ∈∏ i∈I
1st-ord.
Ri, we have the conclusion.
There are no other possibilities for M and N . 
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Lemma 21. Let I be a non-empty index set such that for each i ∈ I , Ri is a reducibility candidate of
proposition A[Ti/X ], and let R =∧ i∈I
abstr.
Ri. Assume that for each i ∈ I , Ri satisﬁes all three clauses
of Proposition 15. Then R is non-empty, and the following hold of all M ∈ R.
(1) M is strongly normalizable.
(2) If M ⇒1 N , then N ∈ R.
(3) MTi ∈ Ri.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of the previous lemma.
Proof of Proposition 15.The proof is by induction on the construction ofR, together with Lemmata
18–21. 
Using Proposition 15 and Lemmata 18–21, we can prove strong normalization by the method of
reducibility candidates.
Deﬁnition 22. For each abstraction term T = x1 · · · xnA, a complex of kind T is a map which sends
n-tuples of ﬁrst-order terms 〈t1, . . . , tn〉 to elements of RA[t1/x1,...,tn/xn]. CT denotes the set of all com-
plexes of kind T . C
n
denotes the union of CT over all n-ary abstraction terms T .
Deﬁnition 23. Let  be a map which sends ﬁrst-order variables to ﬁrst-order terms, and n-ary predi-
cate variables to elements of C
n
. We call such a map an interpretation. We extend  to all ﬁrst-order
terms t by
(t) = t[(x1)/x1, . . . , (xn)/xn], (31)
where {x1, . . . , xn} = FV(t). Moreover, we extend  to arbitrary types and abstraction terms as fol-
lows. Let ⊥ be the set of all strongly normalizable -terms of type ⊥, let VA be the set of all
-variables and constants of type A, and let T be the set of all ﬁrst-order terms.
(t1 = t2) = Dω1(V(t1)=(t2)), (32)
(Xt1 · · · tn) = (X)〈(t1), . . . , (tn)〉, (33)
(A → B) = (A) → (B), (34)
(∀xA) =
∧
t∈T
1st-ord.
[t/x](A), (35)
(∀X nA) =
∧
C∈C n
abstr.
[C/X n](A), (36)
(⊥) and (•A) for a proposition A are deﬁned as (⊥) = ⊥ and (•A) = •(A), respectively.
[t/x] is deﬁned in such a way that for all ﬁrst-order variables except x, it gives the same results
as ; and for x, [t/x](x) = t. The definition of [C/X n] is similar.
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(x1 · · · xnA) is deﬁned as the complex which sends the tuple 〈t1, . . . , tn〉 to [t1/x1, . . . , tn/xn]
(A).
In what follows, we use the abbreviation e for a ﬁnite sequence e1, . . . , en.
Proposition 24. Let M be a -term of type C with free ﬁrst-order variables x1, . . . , xl, free predicate
variables X1, . . . ,Xm, and free -variables 
C1
1 , . . . ,
Cn
n . Let  be an interpretation, and let ti be (xi)
for i = 1, . . . , l. Assume that for each j with 1  j  m, (Xj) ∈ CTj for some abstraction term Tj.
Choose Nk ∈ (Ck) for k = 1, . . . , n. Then we have
M [t/x][T /X ][N/] ∈ (C). (37)
Proof. By induction on the construction ofM .
Case I. M ≡ ai (an axiom). Since (C) = Cl(S ∪ • • (C)) for some S and by definition of Cl,
ai ∈ (C).
Case II.M ≡ i . The conclusion of the proposition is clear from the assumption that Ni ∈ (Ci).
Case III. M ≡ .M1. Here, M1[t/x][T /X ][N/,N/] ∈ ⊥ for N ∈ (•C), by the induction hy-
pothesis. Hence we have .M1[t/x][T /X ][N/] ∈ (C).
Case IV. M ≡ [M1]M2. The conclusion of the proposition follows from Proposition 15.
Case V.M ≡ .M1,M ≡ x.M1, orM ≡ X.M1. The conclusion of the proposition follows from
the construction of . For example, let M ≡ X.M1. Then C is of the form ∀XA1. Let T be an
abstraction term, and let C be a complex of type T . By the induction hypothesis applied to M1,
M1[t/x][T /X , T/X ][N/] ∈ [C/X ](A1). Note that since the types of the individual components of 
donot containX as a freepredicate variable, substitutionofT forX doesnot alter the typesof the-
variables in . By renaming the bound predicate variable X inM , we can safely assume that N does
not contain a free occurrence of X . Hence, we can infer thatM1[t/x][T /X ][N/][T/X ] ∈ [C/X ](A1).
The conclusion follows from the definition of (∀XA1).
Case VI. M ≡ M1M2, M ≡ M1t, or M ≡ M1T . The conclusion of the proposition follows from
Lemmata 19–21. For example, consider the case M ≡ M1T . Then C ≡ A′[T/X r] and M1 is of type
∀X rA′. (r is the arity of X .) Let T˜ be T [t/x][T /X ], and let M˜1 be M1[t/x][T /X ][N/]. By the induc-
tion hypothesis,M1 ∈∧C∈C r
abstr.
[C/X ](A′). ByLemma 21, we have M˜1T˜ ∈ [(T)/X ](A′). Since M˜1T˜ =
M1T [t/x][T /X ][N/]and [(T)/X ](A′) = (A′[T/X ]), the conclusionof theproposition follows. 
In the aboveproposition, choose  so that (xi) = xi for i = 1, . . . , l, and let (Xj) ∈ Cx1···xkj .Xjx1···xrj
for j = 1, . . . ,m, where rj is the arity of Xj . Further, let Nk be k for k = 1, . . . , n. Then we have
M ∈ (C). By Proposition 15, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 25. All -terms are strongly normalizable.
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